Sinicization of the Sacred

Under Xi, “sinicization” weaves Party doctrine into prayer. Crosses and crescents share space with red flags; scriptures are reinterpreted for “core socialist values.” Anti-graft drives hit temple cash and illegal giant statues — Common Prosperity meets the sacred.

Episode Narrative

In the unfolding narrative of contemporary China, a striking transformation has been quietly orchestrated under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The Chinese Communist Party, since 2015, has embarked on an ambitious campaign known as the sinicization of religions. This initiative seeks to merge religious beliefs and practices with core socialist values, effectively intertwining political ideology with spiritual life. It is a potent reminder that in China, faith does not exist in a vacuum; rather, it is molded by the hands of power and policy.

As we step into this complex world, we find an era marked by tension and turbulence. From 2015 to 2025, the campaign intensified, targeting visible symbols of faith. Crosses were removed from churches, crescents disappeared from mosques, and religious texts were scrutinized and reshaped to reflect socialist principles. This effort represents a concerted state initiative aimed at controlling religious expression, minimizing foreign influence, and reshaping the spiritual landscape of a nation steeped in diverse histories and beliefs.

At the heart of this storm lies the Christian community in China. Within its embrace, individuals seek solace and meaning. Yet, over recent years, they have faced relentless pressure under sinicization policies. Church demolitions have become darkly commonplace, while the "Three Rectifications, One Demolition" campaign that swept through Zhejiang province between 2014 and 2015 ignited not just fears but also underground millenarian beliefs among believers. For many, faith has become an act of resistance — an unyielding bond in the face of adversity.

Meanwhile, another significant yet often overlooked community resides at the intersection of culture and belief — the Hui Muslims. With a population surpassing 10 million, the Hui community has been a focal point of sinicization efforts. The state has encouraged the integration of Islam with traditional Chinese culture, yet this seemingly benign blend carries a stark undercurrent. In regions such as Xinjiang and western China, restrictions on religious practices have mounted, a testament to the ruling party’s dual strategy of fostering integration while imposing stringent regulations.

A notable initiative within this framework was the World Muslim City project, designed to mobilize Hui identity for economic and diplomatic purposes. Yet irony resides in the suspension of this project, reflecting the broader anti-Muslim and anti-religious sentiments prevalent in state policies. It underscores the limits of ethnic and religious accommodation under the tightening grip of sinicization, revealing the fragile balance between cultural identity and political control.

Stepping back in time to the 1990s, a revival of traditional religious practices emerged from the shadows of historical oppression. The Mari sacred groves prayers in Bashkortostan, once silenced by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, began to rise again. This resurgence embodies a broader trend of religious revival across China, fueled by a complex interplay of spiritual yearnings and the evolving societal landscape post-1991. However, the revival remains entangled in regulations, as the Chinese state increasingly dictates educational curricula within religious institutions, aligning them with socialist values while stifling independent thought.

The relationship between religion and state in China is a labyrinthine web. Religious organizations are co-opted to serve social goals, such as poverty alleviation and the promise of "common prosperity." Yet, even as they are brought into the fold to help advance state-approved objectives, they remain tethered by the ever-watchful eyes of authority. This tenuous relationship leaves little room for dissent, highlighting the precarious nature of faith in a system that prioritizes control over freedom.

Amidst these complexities lies the Christian concept known as "chao zhengzhi," or supra-politics. This idea emphasizes Christianity as a political threat, a characterization that has been used by the Communist Party since 1949. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the pressure on Christianity to conform to state ideology has intensified further. Still, amidst ideological shifts promoting atheism, a startling truth emerges: trust in religion among educated Chinese citizens has grown. It signifies a complex dynamic — where faith becomes both a refuge and a challenge in an ever-evolving society.

In this context, the government's cultural policy since the 1990s has pushed for the sinicization of all cultural expressions, striving to formulate a coherent, unified national identity. This identity is envisioned to incorporate various religious traditions — Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity — into a seamless socialist tapestry. However, the state's understanding of religion is often devoid of pluralism, relegating it to merely a cultural or security issue. This classification profoundly impacts religious freedom and institutional diversity, shaping how faith manifests in everyday life.

While the Christian social services sector has seen notable growth since the reform era, it operates within confines dictated by the state. Organizations are expected to align their missions with governmental objectives, restricting independent religious activities. The tension here is palpable, with faith communities striving to serve their society while navigating a landscape laden with red tape and oversight.

Equally compelling is the inculturation of Islam among Hui communities in cities like Xi’an, Najiaying, and Hezhou. Here, Islamic rituals are interwoven with Chinese cultural practices, creating a unique tapestry of faith that both enriches and complicates the Hui identity. This process, while encouraged by the state, also reveals the constraints imposed by the very policies meant to promote it.

The anti-corruption initiatives spearheaded by Xi Jinping have aimed at eliminating illegal religious constructions that have sprung up across the nation — grand statues that touch the sky, temples that have become centers of cash flow. Such efforts reflect a broader goal of "common prosperity," which intersects with religious governance. However, these campaigns often carry an undercurrent of fear, prompting many communities to tread lightly, balancing their expressions of faith with the state’s stringent expectations.

Spatial politics within China’s religious landscape add another layer to the ongoing narrative. The management of mosques, churches, and temples serves not only as a method of enforcement of sinicization but also as a means of ethnic and religious assimilation. Urban landscapes, once rich with religious diversity, are increasingly reshaped by policies aimed at controlling and monitoring spiritual spaces, limiting where and how faith can manifest.

As we delve deeper, it is crucial to acknowledge the nuanced role of women in Islamic life within China. Though formal leadership roles are often limited, women actively participate in informal education and community religious activities. Their involvement reflects ongoing gender dynamics within religious communities under state scrutiny, highlighting both empowerment and restriction within an intricate social fabric.

With a dual approach of cooperation and control, China’s strategies regarding religious minorities reveal a delicate balancing act. While the state sometimes recognizes the individuality of different ethnic groups — such as Hui and Uyghurs — it simultaneously employs strict measures to manage perceived threats to social stability. This paranoid vigilance nods at an unsettling truth: the quest for control often overshadows the richness of diversity.

From the rural hinterlands, another phenomenon emerges — the rise of minjian, or folk religion. This grassroots expression of faith in South China highlights a burgeoning hybridization where participants blend traditional rituals with state-paced religious forms. It illustrates the capacity of individuals to adapt, intertwining their cultural heritage with imposed frameworks, each replete with its own meaning.

Furthermore, digital religious networks in China present a striking juxtaposition to traditional expressions of faith. These networks remain highly segregated along lines of belief, often fostering minimal inter-religious interaction. This digital divide underscores the persistent boundaries reinforced by community preferences as well as state policies, further isolating religious communities even in an age marked by connectivity.

As we look back upon this tapestry of religious transformation, one cannot help but ponder the fate of spirituality in the land of the dragon. The sinicization of the sacred serves as both a reflection of deep-rooted desires for unity and a stark reminder of the fragility of faith under state control. The question lingers: can genuine belief coexist within the confines of an ideology that seeks to reshape or redefine it? As the story unfolds, one thing remains clear — the quest for meaning will resonate far beyond the confines of doctrine, echoing through the hearts and actions of those who dare to believe.

Highlights

From 2015 onwards, the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping has promoted the sinicization of religions, aiming to align religious beliefs and practices with core socialist values and Party doctrine, effectively weaving political ideology into religious life. - Between 2015 and 2025, the sinicization campaign intensified, targeting visible religious symbols such as crosses on churches and crescents on mosques, as well as regulating scriptures to reflect socialist principles, reflecting a state effort to control religious expression and reduce foreign influence. - The Christian community in China has experienced significant pressure under sinicization policies, including church demolitions and cross removals, notably in Zhejiang province during the "Three Rectifications, One Demolition" campaign (2014-2015), which sparked underground millenarian beliefs and resistance among believers. - The Muslim Hui community, numbering over 10 million, has been a primary focus of sinicization efforts, with the state promoting the integration of Islam with traditional Chinese culture while simultaneously imposing restrictions on religious practices, especially in Xinjiang and western China. - The World Muslim City (WMC) project in western China, which mobilized Hui identity for economic and diplomatic purposes, was suspended as part of the broader anti-Muslim and anti-religious tenor of PRC policy, illustrating the limits of ethnic and religious accommodation under sinicization. - Since the 1990s, there has been a revival of traditional religious practices such as the Mari sacred groves prayers in Bashkortostan, despite earlier destruction during the Cultural Revolution and anti-religious campaigns; this reflects a broader trend of religious revival and community registration in China post-1991. - The Chinese state has increasingly regulated religious education, including reforms in Muslim education since the early 20th century, with contemporary efforts to align religious curricula with socialist values and state-approved interpretations. - The relationship between religion and state in China remains complex, with religious organizations often co-opted to serve social goals such as poverty alleviation and "common prosperity," while simultaneously being tightly controlled to prevent dissent or foreign influence. - The Christian discourse of "chao zhengzhi" (supra-politics), a concept used by the Communist Party to criticize Christianity as a political threat, continues to influence state-religion relations, with Christianity being pressured to conform to state ideology since 1949 and especially under Xi Jinping. - Despite ideological education efforts promoting atheism and loyalty to the Party, trust in religion among the educated Chinese population has increased, indicating a complex dynamic where religion remains a significant social force even under state pressure. - The Chinese government’s cultural policy since the 1990s has emphasized the "sinicization" of all cultural and religious expressions, aiming to create a unified national identity that incorporates Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity within a socialist framework. - The state’s definition of religion in China excludes pluralism and often classifies religious activities as cultural or security issues, limiting religious freedom and institutional pluralism, which affects how religious diversity is managed and controlled. - The Christian social services sector in China has grown since the reform era but remains limited by government policies that require religious organizations to align with state goals and restrict independent religious activities. - The inculturation of Islam among Hui communities in cities like Xi’an, Najiaying, and Hezhou shows how Islam is adapted locally by blending Islamic rituals with Chinese cultural elements, a process both encouraged and constrained by state sinicization policies. - The anti-corruption and anti-extravagance campaigns under Xi Jinping have targeted illegal religious constructions, such as giant statues and temple cash flows, reflecting the intersection of "common prosperity" goals with religious governance. - The spatial politics of religious sites in China, including the management and control of mosques, churches, and temples, have been used to enforce sinicization and ethnoreligious assimilation, often reshaping urban religious landscapes. - The role of women in Islamic religious life in China remains limited in formal leadership but active in informal education and community religious activities, reflecting ongoing gender dynamics within religious communities under state regulation. - The Chinese state’s approach to religious minorities involves a combination of cooperation and control, with policies that recognize ethnic heterogeneity among Muslims (e.g., Hui vs. Uyghurs) but apply strict measures to manage perceived religious "anxiety" and maintain social stability. - The rise of minjian (folk) religion in rural South China since the 1990s demonstrates religious hybridization, where participants blend traditional rituals with state-approved religious forms, reflecting grassroots adaptation to state power and religious revival. - The digital religious networks in China remain highly segregated by faith, with minimal inter-religious interaction online, illustrating social and cultural boundaries reinforced by both community preferences and state policies. These points provide a data-rich foundation for a documentary episode on the sinicization of religion in contemporary China, highlighting policy developments, community responses, cultural adaptations, and the complex interplay between religion and state from 1991 to 2025. Visuals could include maps of religious site demolitions, charts of religious demographic changes, and footage of ritual hybridization in Hui communities.

Sinicization of the Sacred

Episode Narrative

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