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Khartoum's Twin Generals: War Over Gold and a Capital

Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan vs Mohamed "Hemedti" Dagalo: urban warfare, gold-funded militias, shattered hospitals. Youth resistance, foreign backers, and Red Sea trade shaken as commanders fight for the state — and the supply chains.

Episode Narrative

In the heart of Sudan, a story unfolds, darkened by the shadows of conflict and ambition. Khartoum, the capital, has always been a city of duality. It is a nexus of cultures and histories, a meeting point of the Blue and White Nile rivers, symbolizing both life and strife. In the early twenty-first century, this city became the backdrop for a power struggle that would shape not only its future but that of an entire nation. It was in this environment that two military generals, each with their own ambitions and rivalries, rose to prominence amidst the chaos of war.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the seeds of discord had been sown deep within Sudan. A looming civil war had begun to take root, and by 1991, the country found itself engulfed in turmoil. The conflict was a complex tapestry woven from ethnic, religious, and socio-economic threads. In a land already rife with divisions, the civil war unleashed the fury of rebel factions, pushing the military to adopt increasingly brutal measures. Amidst this upheaval, two figures emerged: General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known widely as Hemedti.

Burhan, the military's established face, held the higher rank. He had long been part of Sudan's military hierarchy, gaining influence through his strategic mind and connections. Hemedti, on the other hand, represented a different breed of military leader. As the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, he had risen from humble beginnings in Darfur, and his command over a militia often accused of human rights abuses only augmented his notoriety. With the Sudanese civil war as their backdrop, these twin generals found their paths intertwined, leading to a dance of rivalry that would ultimately ignite into open conflict.

As the war raged throughout the 1990s, the lessons learned from other African countries served as stark warnings. In neighboring Sierra Leone, the brutal civil war that began in 1991 transformed former rebel commanders into politicians with surprising ease. The conflict there ended in 2002, paving the way for politicians who were once warlords to carve out a new place for themselves in governance. This transformation was facilitated through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs known collectively as DDR. Suddenly, the aura of power that surrounded those who once commanded brutal militias now shimmered with the promise of political capital.

Facing the rise of these individuals who had learned to wield their wartime experiences as political leverage, generals like Burhan and Hemedti understood the stakes. The humanitarian crises plaguing Sudan were compounded by regional instability, particularly following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 2011. With the collapse of Qaddafi's regime, the Sahel region fractured, giving rise to militant groups that threatened to seep across borders, threatening to further plunge Sudan and its neighbors into disorder.

As this reality unfolded, each general began to influence the climate of Khartoum and beyond. Burhan's establishment sought to maintain a semblance of the old order, pushing for traditional military values in governance. Hemedti, ever the opportunist, sought to expand his influence, advocating for the financial gains of his paramilitary forces. Gold, it became clear, was the currency of power. Control of gold mines not only financed operations but also offered a path to credibility in a nation desperate for stability amid chaos.

By 2013, the specter of coups and conflict loomed large over the Central African Republic as well, highlighting the fragile nature of governance across the continent. General Djotodia’s coup marked another point of instability that reverberated through neighboring countries, including Sudan, where the need for strong leadership became ever more pressing. But in Sudan, there was a complicated relationship between military structure and civil order, as both Burhan and Hemedti operated under the same overarching command.

As the years progressed, reports of declining military capabilities and internal discontent were more frequent. This was especially evident in South Africa, where the National Defence Force faced deterioration of resources and capabilities. Such issues highlighted the fragility of military regimes and raised questions about accountability and governance. Despite these challenges, the political landscape across Africa began to evolve. In 2017, the African Union started to exert more authority, especially in response to threats against democratic institutions across the continent, offering a model that Sudan might one day aspire to.

By the time the world turned to 2020, it was painfully clear that the longstanding political conflicts across the African continent were catalyzing new movements of resistance. In Nigeria, the #EndSARS protests revealed a deep-seated desire for reform, as ordinary citizens stood against abuses of power in their own military and police forces. These waves of civil disobedience rippled throughout Africa, with citizens demanding a voice in how they were governed.

In this environment of shifting power dynamics, Burhan and Hemedti were forced to navigate a treacherous climate. Their rivalry for control intensified, underscored by the ongoing economic crises resulting from sanctions and dwindling resources. Amidst economic desperation, the nation's gold reserves tantalized both men, who sought to solidify their influence. In the streets of Khartoum, unrest surged as citizens watched their leaders embroiled in a conflict fueled by ambition rather than the public good.

Yet, throughout these developments, the twin generals maintained an uneasy coexistence. Their alliance allowed them to share power, but it was a fragile partnership, one built on mutual distrust and the specter of betrayal. The ongoing tug-of-war over resource control reached a boiling point as gold mines became territory worth fighting for. Ultimately, armed confrontations erupted, with neighborhoods in Khartoum turning into battlefields.

By 2021, following escalating violence, the situation had deteriorated to a point where Sudan's potential for stability hung by a thread. The African-led Peace Support Operations revealed how essential coordinated efforts were to combat the chaos. Yet, for every action taken, the twin generals displayed adaptability, leveraging their military might against one another, each hoping to emerge as the ultimate victor.

In 2023, a critical analysis of French-led interventions in Mali drew attention to the disutility of force. It illustrated how conventional military approaches often failed to yield political solutions, an echo relevant in Sudan. The conflicts birthed from power struggles often led to further fragmentation, highlighting the inadequacy of outside intervention in addressing root causes of instability.

As Sudan approached 2024, the dynamics of military rule grew even darker. The expressions of deep-seated corruption and personal ambitions among military leaders brought to light the essential question: could a nation effectively recover from a struggle steeped in such profound betrayal? Across the continent, as other nations like Burkina Faso spiraled into conflict, a pattern emerged: military leaders who once fought for survival now battled for legitimacy in a post-war society that seemed to teeter on the edge of the abyss.

In 2025, with Sudan struggling to reconstruct itself amidst a sea of instability, Burhan and Hemedti's extensive legacies would unfold as mirrors reflecting the complexities of military governance and individual power plays. The battle for Khartoum’s heart might flicker between hope and despair, like a candle caught in the strongest of winds.

As we reflect upon this narrative, we must ask ourselves: can a nation heal when its leaders are intricately bound by the cords of past conflicts? The story of Sudan and its twin generals serves as an urgent reminder of the fragility of peace and the scars left behind by war. In a nation crying out for recovery, the path to governance remains perilous. What will it take for Khartoum, a city anchored by both blood and gold, to rise anew, away from the ghosts that haunt its streets? The answer lies in the choices of its leaders, the courage of its people, and the delicate threads of history that bind them all.

Highlights

  • In 1991, Sierra Leone’s civil war began, setting the stage for the transformation of rebel commanders into political leaders after the conflict ended in 2002, as seen in the integration of former warlords into government and political parties through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. - By the late 1990s, many African warlords and rebel leaders had begun to transition into peacetime politicians, leveraging their organizational skills and charisma to adapt to post-conflict societies, often escaping punishment for wartime crimes through peace agreements and reintegration initiatives. - In 2002, Sierra Leone’s civil war concluded, and former field commanders, including those from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), were integrated into the political system, with some becoming leaders of political parties and senior government officials. - The process of transforming rebel leaders into politicians in Sierra Leone was facilitated by the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, which allowed former rebels to escape punishment for crimes committed during the conflict. - In 2011, the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya led to the fracturing of security structures in the Sahel, creating opportunities for militant entrepreneurial groups to organize and inhibit the re-creation of stable states and societies in Mali, Niger, and Algeria. - By 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR) experienced a significant coup attempt led by Michel Djotodia of the Seleka coalition, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and further destabilized the country’s political and economic development. - In 2015, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was found to be in significant decline, with aging equipment and managerial issues contributing to the loss of important military capabilities, as highlighted in the South African Defence Review 2015. - In 2017, the African Union (AU) began to exert more authority on the ground through its anti-coup regime, focusing on the localized enactment and effects of its interventions, as seen in its response to coups in various African countries. - By 2020, Burkina Faso, once considered an “island” of stability in a conflict-prone region, experienced a sudden rise in armed insurgencies, partly due to the demise of the rule and regime of Blaise Compaoré. - In 2020, the #EndSARS movement in Nigeria led to the disbanding of the Special Anti-Robbery Squads (SARS), which had become discredited for malfeasance and abuse of power, marking a significant moment in the country’s civil-military relations. - In 2021, the African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) continued to evolve, with new types of missions such as the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force being deployed to address regional crises. - By 2022, the ethnic stacking practices in African militaries, where leaders use ascriptive identity to build military loyalty, were comprehensively documented, providing insights into the behavior and capabilities of African armed forces. - In 2023, the French-led intervention in Mali was analyzed for its strategic failure, with the concept of ‘disutility of force’ explaining why France’s military approach failed to generate political utility despite a major material power advantage. - In 2023, the leadership challenges in Africa were explored from a Nigerian perspective, highlighting the need to address personal capacity underdevelopment, social-psychological deficiencies, and value misunderstandings to reposition Africa politically. - By 2024, the dynamics of military rule and the experiences of black women in the South African Defence Force’s 32 Battalion were examined, connecting the apartheid military to broader colonial military communities and governance. - In 2024, the role of the Cameroonian and Nigerian military in the post-conflict Bakassi Peninsula was studied, with the region being marred by militant activities even after the end of hostilities. - In 2024, the transformation of regulation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was analyzed, focusing on the long period of political transition and the impact of authoritarianism and political disintegration. - By 2025, the leadership journey in Ghana was examined, with a focus on political leaders, military or civilian, and their administrative leadership styles, providing a framework for understanding the operations of administrative leadership in the country. - In 2025, the military dimension of the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria was explored, highlighting the influence of long-term military rule and the perpetual deployment of Nigerian armed forces in the region. - By 2025, the role of the military in nation-building in Nigeria was assessed, with state creation being seen as an imperative for tackling the problem of nation-building through military contribution.

Sources

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