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Berlin Plus: NATO’s General, Europe’s Orders

The EU borrows NATO muscle. Under 'Berlin Plus', NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe often doubles as EU Operation Commander. Hear how a single general wore two hats in the Balkans, juggling flags, phones, and fragile peace.

Episode Narrative

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the geopolitical landscape of Europe began to reshape itself. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked not just the end of a divided continent but also the dawn of new realities. This era, characterized by uncertainty and ambition, called for innovative frameworks to ensure security and cooperation. Among the pivotal developments was the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992. This treaty formally established the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP, laying a significant cornerstone for the European Union. The vision was bold, aspiring to unify efforts among member states to address crises collectively and effectively. However, even as this treaty sought to strengthen military cooperation, the EU remained a “civilian power” — one without a standing army or unified command structure. The ambition was clear, but the reality remained complicated and hampered by institutional limitations.

Fast forward to 1999, the EU took its first steps beyond mere declarations. The European Security and Defence Policy emerged, marking a turning point in its military ambitions. The Helsinki Headline Goal was established, aiming for a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 soldiers, ready to deploy within 60 days. Yet, this profound goal proved to be elusive. Persistent capability gaps revealed themselves, reminding the EU that ambition alone could not create readiness or effective response mechanisms. The journey towards militarization, though officially launched, faced significant hurdles from the outset.

The scene shifted again in 2003 with the introduction of the “Berlin Plus” agreement. This landmark compact allowed the EU to access NATO's planning capabilities and assets for EU-led operations. In a decision that balanced ambition with pragmatism, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe often served dual roles as the EU Operation Commander. This arrangement created a unique bond between European and transatlantic security approaches that would endure into the 2020s. It mirrored the complexities of a continent grappling with its identity — a fusion of old alliances and new responsibilities.

As the EU began its first military operations, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina through EUFOR Althea, the shadows of NATO's legacy loomed large. This operation, which began in 2004, became the EU's longest-running military engagement, illustrating the blending of NATO’s strategies and EU aspirations. Commanded by generals holding both NATO and EU appointments, the practical overlap in command structures became evident. What began as a quest for distinctiveness often led back to the familiar paths of past alliances.

In 2007, the operationalization of the EU Battlegroups concept aimed to establish rapidly deployable forces, each with 1,500 troops. However, the ghosts of political hesitation and lack of consensus haunted this initiative. Despite being on standby every six months, the Battlegroups never saw combat. This stark reality highlighted the intricate dance of European politics — a choreography often marred by divisions and fraught with the echoes of history.

The next significant shift in this evolving narrative occurred in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine. This aggressive action triggered an alarm that resonated throughout Europe, forcing a reevaluation of defense postures. Suddenly, the emphasis on military mobility and resilience became paramount. The call for joint exercises with NATO brought forth a renewed urgency to counter hybrid threats, emphasizing that collective security was not merely an aspiration, but a critical necessity in a rapidly changing world.

Yet, the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy were met with skepticism. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 sought to assert a form of self-reliance in defense, but member states remained tethered to NATO. A handful of EU-led mission efforts emerged in regions like Africa and the Balkans, but the dichotomy between aspiration and operational capability grew clearer. The framework of cooperation was complex. Formal agreements sat beside realpolitik, creating a tension that rendered collective military efficacy a distant goal.

The launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, in 2017 sought to bring member states together to jointly develop military capabilities. By 2023, 47 projects were underway, yet progress felt slow and fragmented. The fabric of collaboration was stretched thin by divergent national interests, raising questions about the shared commitment to forming a cohesive defense strategy. Each project was a new thread in the intricate tapestry of European security, but whether they would weave together effectively remained uncertain.

In the years that followed, the European Defence Fund allocated nearly €8 billion to joint defense research and development in 2021. This marked a significant step toward creating an integrated EU defense industrial base, yet many procurement processes remained predominantly national. With every intention voiced in statements and policy documents, the ground realities often reflected a reluctance to relinquish national control in defense matters.

Then came 2022, when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine unfolded, underlying the urgency of action in a way that previous events had not. The EU established the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine, known as EUMAM Ukraine, demonstrating its readiness to respond in unprecedented ways. The training of over 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers by early 2025 revealed a tangible commitment, aided by a €49.2 billion military aid package. Germany, Poland, and France emerged as the largest contributors, reflecting both a geopolitical urgency and persistent disparities in defense spending among member states.

By 2023, another chapter in this narrative unfolded — the EU and NATO signed a new Joint Declaration, deepening their cooperation on military mobility, cyber defense, and contemporary hybrid threats. Yet, the stark reality of the EU’s operational dependence on NATO’s planning and command structures became increasingly evident. This evolution was a tapestry woven with hopes of independence but continuously tied to the legacies of its past.

In 2024, the announcement of the EU's Rapid Deployment Capacity aimed to resonate with the earlier concept of Battlegroups but on a more realistic scale. Goals to field a 5,000-strong force by 2025 highlighted a conscious choice to recalibrate expectations, bearing in mind the untested nature of these initiatives in real crises. Could the EU truly find its footing in the stormy seas of global security?

As the years pressed onward, notable strides were made — in 2025, women’s participation in EU military operations reached 15% to 20%. This humble increase marked progress toward inclusivity within the military framework, yet leadership roles remained largely male-dominated. With every success, reminders of the work still necessary lingered like echoes in the air.

While the EU’s military mobility initiative streamlined cross-border troop movements, enabling more agile responses to crises, glaring infrastructure gaps persisted, especially in Eastern Europe. The ambition for seamless integration faced practical challenges, underscoring that despite the best intentions, the journey toward an effective European Union defense apparatus was fraught with obstacles.

Throughout this journey from the Maastricht Treaty to the challenges posed by contemporary crises, the defense landscape in Europe illustrates a deeply human struggle for cohesion in the face of fragmentation. Despite increased defense spending that saw military expenditures rise from €145 billion in 2014 to €215 billion in 2023, the underlying issues remained. The defense industrial base was fragmented, inherently limiting interoperability across states.

In the end, the dichotomy between aspiration and action left a lingering question: could the EU ever transcend the aspirations of strategic autonomy to carve out a definitive role on the global stage? Political divisions and the enduring primary role of NATO often left “strategic autonomy” sounding more like a distant dream rather than an operational reality.

As a new chapter of European security unfolds, the dual-hatted roles of commanders managing NATO and EU priorities offer a fascinating mirror to the complexities of alliance dynamics. A future laden with uncertainty challenges European leaders to navigate both the legacies of history and the aspirations for tomorrow. The landscape of defense and foreign policy in Europe will continue to evolve, but the question remains: How will Europe balance ambition with necessity in a world where security is intertwined with both collective responsibility and national identity?

Highlights

  • 1991–1993: The Maastricht Treaty (1992) formally establishes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), laying the groundwork for EU military cooperation, but the EU remains a “civilian power” with no standing army or unified command structure.
  • 1999: The EU launches its first military operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, later CSDP), with the Helsinki Headline Goal aiming for a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 deployable within 60 days — a target never fully met, highlighting persistent capability gaps.
  • 2003: The “Berlin Plus” agreement allows the EU to access NATO planning capabilities and assets for EU-led operations, with NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) often serving as EU Operation Commander — a unique dual-hatted role that persists into the 2020s.
  • 2004–2025: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes the EU’s longest-running military operation, initially taking over from NATO’s SFOR, and is commanded by a series of generals who also hold NATO appointments, illustrating the practical overlap of NATO and EU command structures.
  • 2007: The EU Battlegroups concept is operationalized, intended as rapidly deployable forces of 1,500 troops each, but political hesitancy and lack of consensus mean they are never deployed in combat, despite being on standby every six months.
  • 2014: Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine triggers a major shift in EU defense posture, with renewed emphasis on military mobility, infrastructure resilience, and joint exercises with NATO to counter hybrid threats.
  • 2016: The EU Global Strategy calls for “strategic autonomy” in defense, but most member states continue to rely on NATO for collective defense, with only a handful of EU-led crisis management missions in Africa and the Balkans.
  • 2017: The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is launched, enabling groups of EU states to jointly develop military capabilities, but progress is slow and fragmented, with 47 projects by 2023 but limited operational impact.
  • 2021: The European Defence Fund allocates nearly €8 billion to joint defense research and development, marking a significant step toward EU defense industrial integration, though procurement remains largely national.
  • 2022: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompts the EU to establish the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), training over 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers by early 2025 and coordinating a €49.2 billion military aid package (€6.1 billion from the European Peace Facility, €43.1 billion from member states).

Sources

  1. https://www.czasopisma.uph.edu.pl/desecuritate/article/view/3928
  2. https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/kbo-2025-0021
  3. https://zeszyty-naukowe.awl.edu.pl/gicid/01.3001.0055.0126
  4. http://visnyk-pravo.uzhnu.edu.ua/article/view/325696
  5. https://journals.umcs.pl/k/article/view/18422
  6. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/16118944251331425
  7. https://mspc.mk.ua/index.php/journal/article/view/132
  8. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/other-publications/women-multilateral-peace-operations-2025-what-state-play
  9. http://journal-app.uzhnu.edu.ua/article/view/334210
  10. https://periodicals.karazin.ua/pbgok/article/view/27577